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Abstract 
 
This paper examines why some customers may want to create a buyer group (BG), and why key 
account management (KAM) may be a tool for the seller to deal with BG members separately 
from customers that remain outside the BG. We find that both actions are related and explain 
each other. The implementation of a KAM program makes it advantageous for some customers 
to belong to a BG, eliminating the inherent instability that would otherwise plague the BG. 
Simultaneously the formation of a BG leads the seller to resort to a KAM approach so as to 
segment the market and charge higher prices to customers remaining outside the group. The 
seller’s commitment problem is then highlighted. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In many economic sectors there is a tendency to configure purchasing groups as a 
means to achieve greater bargaining power vis-a-vis suppliers. Examples of this practice 
include the horizontal integration of cable television operators for the acquisition of 
programs (Chipty and Snyder, 1999) and of small drugstores and hospitals for the 
purchase of pharmaceutical products (Ellison and Snyder, 2001). 
Suppliers, on the other hand, tend to assign strategic importance to the accounts of 
large buyers. Compared to small accounts, the larger accounts are dealt with in a more 
personalized and bilateral fashion. In the jargon of the marketing literature, sellers 
develop key account management (KAM) programs with top sales executives, creating 
a separate sales force or even a separate corporate division (Johnston and Marshall, 
2003). Such strategies are commonplace, and are traditionally justified in terms of the 
importance of personalized treatment in retaining major customers in the face of 
competition (Cappon, 2001; Johnston and Marshall, 2003).  
In this paper, we examine the interaction between a seller with market power and 
its customers when some of them form a buyer group (BG) and the seller deals 
differently with this large customer compared to the small customers that remain 
outside the BG. In particular, we investigate the rationale for creating a BG by some of 
the customers, and the rationale that leads the seller to introduce a KAM approach to 
segment the market configured by the BG members from that of non-members. Indeed, 
market segmentation explains the formation of a BG and vice versa. It is true that BG 
members gain leverage against the seller, but if there is no market segmentation and the 
seller treats all customers – either inside or outside the BG – equally, then independent 
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customers profit more from the formation of the group than customers grouped together. 
As a consequence, each customer has an incentive to freeride, and the BG unravels.  
But it is also true that, whenever there is a BG, the seller wants to segment the 
market and deal with grouped customers separately from small customers. If there is no 
market segmentation, the BG customers together can obtain leverage against the seller 
by restricting their demand. Market segmentation therefore has two main advantages for 
the seller: first, it allows higher prices to be set for independent customers; second, a 
KAM program as a selling strategy leads to a more efficient relationship with BG 
participants.  
Interestingly, the fact that the seller reacts to the formation of a BG with a KAM 
approach encourages the creation of the group itself. In fact, our main contribution in 
this paper is to provide the rationale for the formation of a BG by some customers, and 
to relate it to the implementation of a KAM selling strategy. We find that both decisions 
are closely linked, not only in the rather obvious sense of sellers creating KAM in 
response to the existence of a BG of consumers, but also in the opposite sense of a BG 
emerging and surviving because prospective participants anticipate being treated 
differently from customers remaining outside the group. We show that, without market 
segmentation, buyers are confronted by the standard freerider problem of collective 
action (Olson, 1965; Hardin, 1971). However, when the seller is expected to introduce a 
KAM program as a reaction to the formation of a BG, the freerider problem disappears.1 
Nonetheless, the seller faces a commitment problem in this context: ex-post, once the 
BG has been created, profits increase if a KAM policy is implemented to segment the 
                                                     
1 If the only selling procedure is a supply-function rule (but not a KAM program), the strategic interaction between 
buyers in our model is similar to that of firms facing an oligopoly. Salant et al. (1983) were the first to note that, in a 
Cournot oligopolistic setting, a cartel is not profitable unless a large number of firms enter the cartel; moreover, 
outsiders obtain larger profits than members of the cartel, rendering the cartel unstable. A body of literature initiated 
by Bloch (1996) has analyzed in detail the severity of the stability problem in the process of cartel formation (see 
Bloch, 2005, for a sound survey of this topic). 
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market, whereas ex-ante, profits would be larger if implementing a KAM program could 
be avoided, since the BG would not emerge in such a case. 
To explore why a subset of customers might want to form a BG, and why the 
seller would develop a KAM policy as a reaction, we consider an industry with a 
monopolistic seller and a continuum of homogeneous buyers. In this set up, we assume 
the seller has minimal marketing tools consisting of a supply-function rule.2 We also 
assume that independent customers behave as price takers, since they are sufficiently 
small to have a negligible impact on market prices. We then analyze the incentives to 
create a BG through the strategic impact of the demand of its members on the market 
price, and the seller’s strategic reaction of offering bilateral contracts  the KAM 
strategy  to the BG members.3  
The impact of bilateral deals and contracts on market competition has long been 
addressed in the industrial organization literature. For potential entrants into an industry, 
for instance, it has been argued that contracts between incumbent firms and buyers can 
act as an entry barrier (Innes and Sexton, 1994; Segal and Whinston, 2000). Beyond 
this, our results suggest that, even in the absence of potential entrants, bilateral contracts 
may be considered by the seller and by some of its existing customers for their 
transactions.  
In comparing the relative merits of different sales modalities in a range of 
circumstances, a number of studies are of particular relevance to our research. First, 
when demand is uncertain, competing sellers are better off announcing supply functions 
rather than posting prices or quantities (Klemperer and Meyer, 1989). Second, with 
                                                     
2 A posted price is not optimal when demand is uncertain and when it cannot be responded to with an instantaneous 
adjustment of prices (Klemperer and Meyer, 1989). Moreover, the supply function rule may represent the decision 
rule imposed by top management on lower-level management, as would be realistic in a firm with different levels of 
sales management and in which top managers transmit rules of behavior that are useful under different contingencies 
but cannot obtain immediate feedback about the actual state of demand (Basu, 1993, p. 142). 
3 The implementation of the KAM program is assumed to be costless and implies the creation of a special sales force 
that is not obliged to follow general pricing guidelines but is instead allowed to deal with customers grouped together. 
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asymmetric information and heterogeneous customers, an auction is more profitable for 
the seller than a posted price (Wang, 1993). Third, under asymmetric information, 
bilateral bargaining is preferable for the seller to posted-price selling in a dynamic 
context (Wang, 1995). Finally, Ausubel et al. (2014) show the incentives of large buyers 
in multi-unit auctions to reduce demand and shade bids differently across units, which 
leads to inefficiencies both in uniform-price and pay-as-bid auctions, and that the latter 
often outperform the former in terms of efficiency and expected revenues. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
industry model used, namely, one consisting of a single producer that sells a 
homogeneous good to a continuum of buyers of equal size. Section 3 analyzes industry 
performance when all customers act independently and the seller submits a supply 
schedule. Section 4 examines market outcome when some customers form a BG and act 
strategically by submitting an aggregate demand function, with the seller continuing to 
submit a supply function rule as the selling method. It is demonstrated that, in this 
context, independent customers profit more than BG members from the existence of a 
BG and, as a consequence, the BG is not stable. Section 5 analyzes the market outcome 
when the seller can offer a deal to BG customers different to that offered to independent 
customers. In this case, we find that seller’s profits increase with market segmentation, 
and customers outside the BG are worse off than BG members, with the consequence 
that the group becomes stable. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
2. The model 
 
Consider an industry consisting of a monopolist that sells a homogeneous product to a 
continuum of n identical customers. A subset of these customers may be associated in a 
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BG, whereas the remaining customers continue to purchase on an independent basis. If 
some customers are grouped together, the seller is aware both of this and of the BG’s 
size. Let k, nk ≤≤0 , be the cardinal of customers that have decided to join the BG; 
thus, the BG’s relative size, nks ≡ , can vary from 0 (in which case the seller may act as a 
pure monopoly) to 1 (and then there is a bilateral monopoly). Bearing in mind the 
expected demand function,4 we assume until Section 5 that the seller’s strategy is to set 
the linear supply function  
 
ppS θ=)( ,                                                              (1) 
 
where p denotes the price of the good, and parameter θ , 0>θ , measures the slope of 
the supply function chosen by the seller. In Section 5 we will assume that the seller can 
segment the market and, in addition to a linear supply function for independent 
customers as reflected in Eq. (1), can also offer personalized treatment  in the form of 
a KAM approach  to customers associated in a BG.  
Each individual consumer i (whether or not a BG member) is assumed to have 
the quasi-linear utility function wqqqU iii +




 −=
2
11)( , where iq  denotes the quantity 
consumed, and w stands for the numeraire. The consumer surplus therefore amounts to 
 
iiiii pqqqpqqU −




 −=−
2
11)( ,                                              (2) 
 
                                                     
4 As stated in the Introduction, we follow Klemperer and Meyer (1989) in using a supply function to represent the 
seller’s pricing policy. 
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where p denotes the price of the good. On the other hand, the seller’s production costs 
are assumed to be  
 
2
2
);( qqC λλ = ,                                                             (3) 
 
where λ , 0>λ , is a constant that measures the degree of convexity of the cost 
function.  
Independent buyers are assumed to be price takers since they are small and so 
have no impact on market outcomes. They therefore demand the quantity that 
maximizes their consumer surplus, as given in Eq. (2). In contrast, a BG of relative size 
s announces an aggregate demand for its members that takes into account the impact of 
this demand on market price. Thus, the BG strategically chooses the slope of the per-
BG member demand function. If there is a unique market-clearing price, the seller’s 
production is given by its supply function at this equilibrium price, and buyers obtain 
the amount of product given by their demand schedule at that market-clearing price. 
 
3. Market equilibrium: independent buyers  
 
If all buyers purchase the product on an independent basis, the maximization of their 
consumer surplus, as reflected in Eq. (2), yields individual demand ppDi −=1)(  for 
each one. Hence, the seller faces market demand  
 
 )1()()( pnpnDpD i −=≡                                                     (4)  
 
and seeks to maximize profits, that is,  
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 22 )]1([)1())(()(max pnppnpDCppDp −−−=−
λ . (5) 
 
The optimal price satisfies the first-order condition  
 
 0)(
)(
)()()( =
∂
∂
∂
⋅∂
−+
∂
∂
p
pD
pD
CpDp
p
pD , (6) 
 
which, for our demand and cost functions, can be particularized as  
 
 0)2(1 =+−+ pzz , (7) 
 
where parameter z  is defined as nz λ≡ , that is, as the product of the degree of 
convexity of the seller’s cost function and the market size. Instead of setting the optimal 
posted price zzp ++= 21m , where superscript m denotes a pure monopoly scenario, the seller 
can get the same profits by setting a supply function as in Eq. (1) that clears the market 
at the optimal monopoly price mp . Taking Eq. (7) into account, the market-clearing 
condition )()( pDpS =  yields the seller’s optimal supply function 
 
 p
z
npS
+
=
1
)( , (8) 
 
which has slope 
z
n
+
=
1
mθ . All the equilibrium values are obtained directly and can be 
summarized in Lemma 1. 
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Lemma 1. When all customers buy on an independent basis, then: 
(i) Each customer consumes the quantity 
z
qi +
=
2
1m  at price
z
zp
+
+
=
2
1m . 
(ii) Each customer obtains the consumer surplus 2
m
)2(2
1
z
CSi +
= . 
(iii) The seller obtains the profit
)2(2
m
z
n
+
=π . 
  
The equilibrium described in Lemma 1 is adopted as a benchmark when large, strategic 
buyers arise as a BG and the price of the good is the same for customers inside and 
outside the BG (as in Section 4), or when the seller uses a KAM program to deal with 
the BG members separately from the independent buyers (as in Section 5). 
 
4. Market equilibrium: buyer group 
 
Consider now the situation in which a subset of k customers, nk ≤≤0 , forms a BG to 
purchase the good, while kn − customers are left as independent buyers. As in Section 
3, each small buyer has the demand function ppDi −=1)( , and the seller has the supply 
function ppS θ=)( . But this time there is a BG that simultaneously has the aggregate 
demand function )1()( pkpDBG −= α , where subscript BG refers to the buyer group. The 
equilibrium price is thus determined by the market-clearing condition   
 
)()()()( pSpDknpD iBG =−+ ,                                               (9) 
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which, for our linear demand and supply functions, becomes ppkn θα =−−− )1)](1([  
or, equivalently, ppsn θα =−−− )1)](1(1[ . The market clearing price is thus 
)]1(1[
)]1(1[
)1(
)1(
αθ
α
αθ
α
−−+
−−
−−+
−− == sn
sn
kn
knp .  
When a BG exists, the BG and the seller simultaneously choose the slopes of their 
demand and supply functions, respectively. Therefore α , the slope of the per-BG 
member demand function, is chosen strategically to maximize the consumer surplus of 
the BG members, taking into account both the expected (non-strategic) behavior of the 
buyers outside the BG and the expected strategic behavior of the seller. In this scenario, 
the incentive of the BG to withdraw demand from market is reflected in the fact that 
1<α . The seller, in turn, when deciding on the amount of product to place in the 
market, anticipates the monopsonistic behavior of the BG and accordingly adapts its 
supply-function schedule )( pS .  
Below, we look for the optimal slope of the BG’s demand for any given slope of 
the supply function, )(θΨα BG= ,  and the optimal slope of the seller’s supply for any 
given slope of the BG’s demand, )(αΨθ S= , where subscript S refers to the seller. We 
then look for the slopes profile that constitutes a Nash equilibrium in slopes.  
The residual supply faced by the BG at any price p, )()()()( pDknpSpRS i−−= , is 
given by )()()( knpknpRS −−−+= θ . Thus, the price that maximizes the consumer 
surplus of the BG members is the price that solves the problem 
 
( ) [ ])()())(()()(1max 212 )( knpknpknknpRSppRS kkpRSp −−−+++−+=−− θθ .       (10) 
 
 The corresponding first-order condition is given by  
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( ) [ ] 0))(()()(1 21)()( =−+++−−+=−−−∂∂ pknknknnpRSp kk pRSp pRS θθθ ,        (11) 
 
yielding the optimal price 
212
21
))((
2)(*
s
nn
s
n
knkn
knnp
−+




 +
−+
−+++
−+ == θθ
θ
θθ
θ . In order to maximize the 
consumer surplus of its members, the BG must choose an aggregate demand function 
that clears the market, )()( pRSpDBG = , at price *p . This affords the aggregate demand 
function  
 
 )1(
1
1)1(1)( *** p
n
snsp
n
kkpDBG −












+
−=−





+
−=
θθ
. (12) 
 
If the seller is expected to follow the supply function given by Eq. (1), and if the 
demand of independent buyers is ppDi −=1)( , then the best response of the BG as a 
whole is to set the aggregate demand function given in Eq. (12), for which the optimal 
slope of the per-member demand function is given by  
 
 
1
11)(
+
−=
+
−==
n
BG
s
n
k
θθ
θΨα . (13) 
 
It can be noted from Eq. (13) that 1)(0 << θΨ BG , i.e. the BG orders a smaller per-
member quantity than non-BG members for a given market price. As a consequence, 
non-BG members freeride the BG and obtain a larger consumer surplus than BG 
members themselves. 
In the presence of a BG, the demand the seller faces at any price p is given by  
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 )1)(()()()()( pkknpDknpDpD iBG −+−=−+= α                               (14) 
 
and, in order to choose the optimal linear supply function, the seller seeks to maximize 
profits by selecting a point in the residual demand and by choosing a supply function 
which equals demand at the optimal price, as in Eq. (8). The optimal price is then 
)1(2
)1(1
)(2
)(1*
α
α
αλ
αλ
ssz
ssz
kkn
kknp +−+ +−++−+ +−+ == , and the linear supply function that leads to this price has slope 
 
 )1(1 1)(1)( αααλ ααΨθ ssz sskkn kknS n +−+ +−+−+ +− === . (15) 
 
From Eqs. (13) and (15) it follows that 0)( >′ θΨBG  and 0)( >′ αΨS , i.e. both actions —the 
BG’s behavior in choosing α  and the seller’s behavior in setting θ  — are strategic 
complements (Bulow et al., 1985), as illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
                  
 
Figure 1. Reaction functions of the seller, θ(α), and the buyer group, α(θ), for z =1.4 and s=0.6. 
 
The solution to Eqs. (13) and (15) yields the following proposition: 
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Proposition 1. When a subset of customers forms a BG, the equilibrium is unique and is 
as follows: 
(i) BG members choose )1(2
)1)(1(2)21()21(2)1(421*
zs
szszszzs
+
−+−−+−++−=α   and the seller chooses 
)1(2
)21()21(2)1(421*
z
szszzsn +
−−−++−=θ . 
(ii) The larger the BG, the flatter the BG’s demand function and the seller’s supply 
function. 
 
Proof. See the Appendix.  
 
Compared with Lemma 1, part (i) of Proposition 1 shows that the BG withdraws 
demand from the market, 1* <α , and that the seller reacts to the existence of a BG with 
a flatter supply function than when all customers buy independently, m* θθ < . The 
intuition regarding this result is as follows: the existence of a BG reduces aggregate 
demand, and this leads the seller to react by increasing price sensitivity to any increase 
in supply. Part (ii) of the lemma indicates that both these behaviors are exacerbated as 
the BG is enlarged. 
Given the equilibrium behavior reflected in Lemma 1 and Proposition 1, it can 
immediately be concluded that the equilibrium quantity decreases in k, the number of 
customers that decide to create the BG. However, less evident is what happens to the 
equilibrium market price. Tedious algebraic manipulation shows that 
  
 ( ) 



 +=+=
−++
−
−+++
+−
)21(2)1(4
21
)2)(2(
))((* 1
2
11
2
1
szz
s
knkn
knkn zp λλλλλ ,  (16) 
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which allows us to conclude that m* pp <  and 0* <∂
∂
s
p . Hence, the equilibrium market 
price is lower whenever there is a BG, and decreases as the size of the BG increases. 
Figure 2, which illustrates market equilibrium with and without a BG, depicts aggregate 
demand and supply functions when there is a BG with outside customers acting 
individually (broken lines), and when all customers purchase on an independent basis 
(continuous lines).  
 
Figure 2. Market equilibrium when all customers act independently (continuous line) and when some of 
the customers form a buyer group (broken line) for z=1.4 and s=0.6. 
 
 
The consumer surplus of the BG and non-BG members can now be compared. From 
their respective consumption levels in equilibrium, )1( *** pqBG −=α  and ∗−= pqi 1m , the 
consumer surplus obtained amounts to   
 
  2
2)1)(2( ∗−∗−∗= pBGCS
αα  (17) 
 
for the BG members, and to 
 
 2
2)1( ∗−= piCS   (18) 
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for each customer outside the BG. From Eqs. (17) and (18) it follows that whenever 
there is a BG withdrawing demand from the market, non-BG members are better off 
than BG members. In Lemma 2 below we examine the impact of the BG’s size on the 
consumer surplus of BG members, BGCS , the consumer surplus of non-members, iCS , 
and the seller’s profit, Sπ . 
 
Lemma 2. Given parameter z, if a BG of size s exists, then, in equilibrium, the 
consumer surplus of BG members, the consumer surplus of non-BG members, and the 
seller’s profit are, respectively, 
)1()1(41)]1(2[)1)](1()1(4[
1
2222222
2
)(
szzsszsszz
s
BG sCS −++−−++−−++
−= ,
2
)1()1(4
1
22
2
1
8
1)( 



 −=
−++
−
szz
s
i zsCS , and )1()1(4
1
22
2
2
)( szz
s
S
ns
−++
−=π . 
 
Proof. See the Appendix.  
 
Lemma 2 allows for analysis of how the consumer surplus of BG members evolves with 
size s of the group. It is not difficult to see that this will increase as the BG grows, 
provided the BG is not too large. The seller’s profit always falls as the size of the BG 
grows, and is, therefore, always lower than it would be in the absence of a BG, mππ <S .  
 
Proposition 2. When a subset of customers forms a BG, the following holds: 
(i) If 1>z , for BGs of a sufficiently small size as ( )ss ,0∈ , being 10 << s , their 
members are better off than if no BG would exist, m)( iBG CSsCS > . In particular, the size 
of the BG that maximizes the consumer surplus of its members amounts to 
 16 
2/1
)1(
)1(222*
2



=
−
+−++
zz
zzzzs . Moreover, 0
*
>
∂
∂
z
s . For the remaining values of parameters 
z and s, the creation of a BG is not profitable for its members, 0* =s . 
(ii) BG members are always worse off than non-BG members, )()( sCSsCS iBG < . 
(iii)  Seller profits are lower than when all customers buy independently, m)( ππ <sS , 
and decrease as the size of the BG grows, 0)( <∂∂ ssSπ . 
 
Proof. See the Appendix   
 
Part (i) of Proposition 2 establishes that a BG makes sense. If, given the total number of 
buyers n, the convexity of the seller’s cost function satisfies n/1>λ , then BG members 
may be better off (with a judiciously chosen BG size) than if they purchase on an 
independent basis, despite the fact that the seller reacts to the presence of a BG by 
reducing supply. Intuitively, when costs increase quickly, total production becomes 
smaller and it becomes crucial for customers to obtain a good market price through the 
formation of a BG.   
Part (i) also shows that the optimal size of the BG, *s , goes from 0 to 1 as 
parameter λ  increases and only approaches 1 as ∞→z  (see  Figure 3). In other words, 
the BG never incorporates all buyers, since the seller can react by setting a flatter supply 
function as the BG grows in size. In addition, the BG grows as the seller’s cost function 
becomes more convex (a larger λ), and/or there are more buyers in the market (a larger 
n).  
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Figure 3. Optimal size of the buyer group as a function of parameter z. 
 
 
Once we have seen that a BG makes sense, does it emerge? We can infer the answer 
from part (ii) of Proposition 2, which illustrates well-known results from the literature 
regarding collective action: a BG is unstable whenever outsiders are better off than 
insiders. Membership is therefore not profitable when there is no market segmentation, 
since all prospective participants prefer to freeride. Similar results are reported in the 
collusion and cartel literature. For instance, in their seminal analysis, Salant et al. (1983) 
demonstrated how non-participants in a cartel can freeride on the behavior of cartel 
participants and so obtain larger profits than the latter.  
Finally, part (iii) of Proposition 2 is the consequence of the seller being unable to 
offset the profit reduction caused by the BG withholding demand. If a BG emerges, the 
seller should consider how to deal with its members. This opens the door for a KAM 
approach: the seller can try to eliminate the BG’s ability to affect prices by segmenting 
the market. This is the possibility examined in Section 5, where we show that, in this 
case, the instability of the BG must be re-examined. 
Figure 4 illustrates how the welfare of both BG members and non-BG members 
evolves with the size of the BG for a given value of parameter z, for which the 
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formation of a BG will increase the consumer surpluses of both members and non-
members with respect to the scenario depicted in Section 3, in which no BG emerged 
( 0* =s ). 
 
 
Figure 4. Consumer surplus for buyer group members, CSBG(s), and non-buyer group members, CSi(s), as 
a function of the size of the buyer group, for z=1.4, without a key account management 
program. 
 
 
5. Market equilibrium: KAM approach  
 
We now discuss market outcome when the seller uses a KAM program to deal with the 
BG, instead of a supply-schedule rule as in Section 4 above. The interaction between 
buyers and the seller we now consider has the following timing. First, a BG of size s is 
formed by some customers. Next, the seller offers a KAM program to customers in the 
BG to deal with them, being modeled that program as a personalized or bilateral 
contract for BG members. If there is agreement, the seller uses a supply function (as in 
Sections 3 and 4) to deal with customers outside the BG who purchase on an 
independent basis. In the event of disagreement between the seller and the BG 
members, the seller maintains with all buyers the relationship previously considered in 
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Section 4. For simplicity sake, two additional assumptions are made: first, the 
agreement between the seller and the BG is restricted to a unit price BGp  for its 
members; and second, the seller holds all the bargaining power in negotiations with BG 
members. 
To make the analysis tractable, it is useful to assume linear prices in the bilateral 
deal between the seller and the BG, and also to assume that the seller can make a take-
it-or-leave-it offer to the BG, implying that the proposed linear price is that which leads 
BG members to receive their reservation value (the consumer surplus obtained in the 
supply-demand function regime analyzed in Section 4). Finally, note that the 
implementation of the KAM program with non-BG members is not useful, because, 
since these buyers are price takers, a separate linear price does not increase profits. 
In theory, direct dealing with customers in a BG through a KAM approach 
accrues two potential benefits for the seller. First, the relationship between the seller and 
the BG is more efficient, since the incentive to withhold demand disappears, and, as a 
consequence, the seller can potentially extract more profit from BG members. Second, 
since KAM prevents BG demand from being mixed with independent buyers demand, 
there is no impact of BG market power on transactions with independent customers. 
Hence, the agreement prejudices independent customers, who will experience a price 
increase.  
Turning to the analysis of this set-up, we first look at the behavior of the seller 
when a BG of size s already exists and the seller introduces a KAM program. The seller 
offers a linear price BGp  to BG members, which leads to aggregate BG demand of 
)1( BGpsn − . When setting a supply function for independent buyers, the seller seeks, for 
the equilibrium price ip , the demand function of independent buyers that maximizes 
profits. The seller therefore chooses a pair of prices ),( iBG pp  that solves the problem 
 20 
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where the first restriction is the participation constraint of the BG members, and the 
second restriction is a feasibility constraint.  
It is useful to analyze the case in which the BG participation constraint affects the 
seller’s problem as defined in (19). Given z, the value s  defined in Proposition 2 is the 
BG size satisfying  
 
 )()0( sCSCS BGBG = .  (20) 
 
The condition reflected in Eq. (20) allows us to define a BG of size s, ]1,(ss∈ , for 
which )()0( sCSCS BGBG >  holds. In other words, if BG members reject the seller’s offer 
and they interact as in Section 4, then a group of size greater than s  would be worse off 
than if all the buyers acted independently. In the interval ]1,(s , price mppBG =  is 
feasible (the participation constraint for the BG is not binding), and for independent 
buyers, the seller can set a supply function that leads to price mppi = . Therefore, 
through a KAM program, in the interval ]1,(s , the seller can achieve the profits 
obtained by a monopolist facing non-strategic buyers as in Section 3. In contrast, in the 
interval ],0( ss∈ , the participation constraint for the BG is binding.  
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Lemma 3 characterizes the pair of prices ),( iBG pp  that solves the problem stated in 
(19). 
 
Lemma 3. If z>1 and ],0( ss∈ , prices paid by BG customers and by independent 
customers are such that iBG ppp << m . Thus, iiBG CSCSCS >> m .  
 
Proof. See the Appendix.  
 
Lemma 3 shows the striking result that, for BGs of size below s , implementation of a 
KAM program leads the seller to squeeze out independent buyers. Figure 5 shows how 
BG membership affects the consumer surplus attained with KAM for different BG 
sizes.  
 
 
 
Figure 5. Consumer surplus for buyer group members, CSBG(s), and non-buyer group members, CSi(s), as 
a function of the size of the buyer group, for z=1.4, when a key account management program 
is implemented. 
 
 
Given the market size n, as the BG grows, and as lower prices are offered to BG 
members (increasing their level of consumption), the seller must restrict supply to 
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independent buyers in order to contain production costs.5 When the BG reaches a size 
equal to or greater than s , the participation constraint is no longer binding, and 
implementation of a KAM program leads to the same price level as that of emerging in 
a market with price-taking consumers. 
 
5.1 Buyer group stability revisited 
 
In Section 4 we showed that a BG is intrinsically unstable in the absence of a KAM 
selling strategy. Indeed, the formation of a BG is beneficial for members only if it does 
not exceed a maximum size, and the BG is, in any case unstable, since independent 
buyers profit more from its existence than BG members themselves. Lemma 3, 
however, suggests that if the good is sold through a KAM program to the BG 
customers, then independent customers may be squeezed out. Hence, if the prospective 
members of a BG anticipate that they will be treated differently from independent 
buyers, then they may have a strong incentive to join.  
Thus, considering the case in which customers form a BG when they expect to be 
better off than if they acted independently, and also that BG membership may be 
restricted whenever an additional entrant reduces the per-capita consumer surplus of 
members, the following result holds. 
 
Proposition 3. If z>1 and the seller can introduce a KAM program, a BG of size s* 
emerges and remains stable. 
 
                                                     
5 For some parameter values, independent customers are not even served at all.  
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A BG would not be created if its members did not expect personalized treatment from 
the seller in return. Different treatment solves the freerider problem that would 
otherwise plague the creation of a BG, and also stabilizes the BG by making the 
consumer surplus of its members greater than that of non-members (and no less than 
that of BG members in the absence of a KAM program). Furthermore, although, ex-
post, it is in the seller’s interest to introduce a KAM policy to deal with the BG, this 
never allows the seller to achieve profits as large as when a supply function is applied in 
the absence of a BG. Hence, no BG will emerge if the seller can commit to never 
resorting to KAM and can serve all customers on equal terms, as in Section 4. The 
formation of a BG thus depends both on the increasing surpluses of its members and on 
the pressure placed on the seller to implement a KAM policy. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
Traditional wisdom has it that sellers implement a KAM approach so as to court large 
clients by offering better terms than to small or independent customers. However, we 
provide another rationale for introducing a KAM program. When dealing through a 
supply-schedule mechanism with customers grouped in a BG and with independent 
customers, the seller faces reduced demand as well as reduced profit when BG members 
are charged the same price as non-BG members. It is thus in the seller’s interest to deal 
with the BG members by direct negotiation rather than through supply-function pricing, 
and to deal with any customer outside the BG in accordance with a supply function.  
 This market segmentation between KAM and non-KAM customers allows the 
seller to limit the impact of the BG on transactions between the seller and independent 
customers. By preventing customers within the BG from purchasing the product in 
 24 
competition with independent customers, the seller is able to exploit the latter more 
efficiently. In other words, bilateral bargaining with the BG enables the seller to 
partially make up for the negative impact of the BG on profits by increasing profits 
obtained from customers outside the BG. As a result, the consumer surplus of customers 
outside the BG is lower than it would be if no BG existed, and is also lower than that of 
BG customers. Thus, joining the BG is advantageous to buyers.  
 In sum, a BG, although initially unstable because of the threat of freeriders, has 
the potential to acquire stability when a KAM approach is implemented as a selling 
method and, therefore, price discrimination emerges. Since the seller is better off 
without a BG, i.e. when all transactions take place according to supply-demand 
functions, a BG would never emerge if the seller could avoid resorting to the KAM 
program. The formation of a BG thus depends on pressure on the seller to implement a 
KAM program with customers organized in a BG.  
We restricted our analysis to incentives to form a single BG. An interesting 
avenue for future research is whether other coalitions of buyers could emerge and, more 
generally, what the final, endogenous organization of customers would be if more than 
one BG was possible. A further question of interest for future research is to understand 
what happens when buyers are retailers rather than end users of a good. Our findings 
suggest that, in this three-tiered situation of sellers, retailers and consumers, 
independent retailers would pay higher wholesale prices than grouped retailers, and 
would, accordingly, re-sell the product to their clients at higher retail prices. We thus 
conjecture that we could explain the frequently observed inefficiency of small, 
independent retailers in comparison with large retailers as the result of economies of 
scale in purchasing, not in production.  
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) The fact that 
n
k
BG −=Ψ 1)0(  is strictly positive whenever 
1<k  leads any equilibrium to require fulfilment of the condition 01 >−>
n
k
α . Consider 
the two functions )(1 αΨθ −= BG  and . Any equilibrium is a value for α  in the interval 
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[ ]1,1 nk−  for which )()( 1 αΨαΨ −= BGS  holds. On one hand, note that at the corner, i.e. 
whenever nk−=1α , it holds that )1()1( 1 nkBGnkS −>− −ΨΨ . On the other hand, for 1=α , it 
holds that znS += 1)1(Ψ  and . Since both the  and  functions are 
continuous, they must cross somewhere in the interval [ ]1,1 nk− . Hence, there must be 
at least one equilibrium point. However, the fact that 
 
 α
α
ααλα
α
∂
Ψ∂
−+−+∂
Ψ∂ −=<= )()1()](1[
)( 1
22
BGS k
kkn
k                               (A1) 
 
allows us to conclude that once both functions cross, they do not cross again. Therefore, 
the equilibrium is unique and is provided by the values *α  and *θ  obtained from 
solving Eqs. (13) and (15). 
(ii) It immediately follows that 0
*
<∂
∂
s
α  and 0
*
<∂
∂
s
θ . ￭ 
 
Proof of Lemma 2. From Proposition 1, we have the equilibrium values for the demand 
and supply slopes *α  and *θ , respectively, as well as the equilibrium price *p  stated in 
Eq. (16). Inserting these values into Eqs. (17) and (18) we obtain the values for the 
consumer surplus of  BG members and independent buyers, respectively; and replacing 
the equilibrium price in Eq. (5) we obtain seller’s profits )(sSπ . ￭ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2. Define 21 sx −= . We can rewrite the consumer surplus of BG 
members as 
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from which we obtain  
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The denominator of Eq. (A3) is always positive. Thus, we can determine the sign of the 
derivative by inspecting the sign of the numerator. First notice that the numerator is 
decreasing in x. When 0=x , the numerator is positive, 0)1(4 >+ z  and when 1=x , the 
numerator becomes )1))(1)(2(2 zzz −++  and takes positive value if and only if 1<z . 
Therefore:  
• If 1<z , then x
xCS BG
∂
∂ )(  is always positive along [ ]1,0∈x  and the consumer surplus 
of BG members is maximized at 1* =x ; that is, taking into account that 
xs −= 1 , we obtain 0* =s . 
• If 1>z , then 0)( =
∂
∂
x
xCSBG  at [ ] ( )1,0)1()1(2)1( 2* ∈+−+= − zzzx zz , and 
0)( >
∂
∂
x
xCSBG  if and only if *xx < . Taking into account again that xs −= 1 , we 
obtain that the consumer surplus of BG members is maximized at 
2/1
)1(
)1(22* 2






=
−
+−++
zz
zzzzs . Furthermore, since 0)0( ==xCSBG , it follows that 
0)1()( * >=> xCSxCS BGBG  and 0
)( >
∂
∂
x
xCSBG  along ),0( *xx∈ . By continuity 
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there is a value ),0( *xx∈  such that )1()( => xCSxCS BGBG  if and only if 
)1,(xx∈ .                                                                                             ￭ 
 
Proof of Lemma 3.  If m)( iBG CSsCS < , the optimal price p
m is that which solves the 
first-order condition of the problem given in Eq. (19) and the participation constraint is 
not binding, )(
2
)1( 2m sCSp BG>
− . On the contrary, if m)( iBG CSsCS > , the participation 
constraint is binding, and both price BGp  and price ip  that solve Eq. (19) are  
 
)(21 sCSp BGBG −=                                                              (A4) 
 
and  
 
szz
pszzp BGi −+
−+
=
2
1 ,                                                          (A5) 
 
respectively. On further inspection, it is evident that whenever m)( iBG CSsCS > , it holds 
that iBG ppp <<
m , where 
z
zp
+
+
=
2
1m  according to Lemma 1. ￭ 
 
